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INTRODUCTION: ‘THE OXFORD SOLAR MYTH’ 
 
In 1870, a text written by the Anglo-Irish clergyman Richard Frederick Littledale 
appeared in Kottabos, a magazine published by Trinity College in Dublin. This article 
addresses a subject that in the first instance sounds both implausible and exotic – 
namely, the existence of something referred to as ‘The Oxford Solar Myth’: 
 
A very singular tradition, possibly due to the influence of classical 
Paganism in the course of study, still preserves, in the Oxford of the 
nineteenth century, the evident traces of that primeval Nature-worship 
whereby the earliest parents of the Aryan race marked their observance of 
the phenomena of the heavens […]. The Legend takes its not infrequent 
shape of celebrating a great teacher, passing from his Eastern birthplace on 
to the West […] The symbolical name by which the hero was deified, even 
in our own days, is Max Müller. […]. Müller, applied in the late High 
German dialects to the mere grinder of corn, denotes in its root-form a 
pounder or crusher […] The more scientific aspect of the question 
recognises here the Sun-God, armed with his hammer or battle-axe of light, 
pounding and crushing frost and clouds alike […] We require more exact 
data before we can with authority allege that Max Müller is indeed the Sun, 
or rather the Dawn, himself. But these data are accessible and abundant. 2 
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This parody of the writings of Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900) appeared in the 
1909 edition of Müller’s well-known essay (actually a book length treatise) on 
Comparative Mythology, which was first published in 1856 and which made his name 
in British academia beyond the confines of Müller’s narrower specialism: the 
philology of ancient South Asian languages, primarily Sanskrit. The fact that this 
parody already appeared in 1870, only fourteen years after Müller’s essay on 
Comparative Mythology, demonstrates how quickly his theories concerning 
mythology and comparative philology came to attract criticism and even ridicule.3 
More surprising still is the decision of Abraham Smythe Palmer, Lecturer in Divinity 
at Trinity College in Dublin, to reprint this parody in his 1909 edition of Müller’s 
essay on Comparative Mythology. But the reason for this now seems relatively clear: 
by the early twentieth century, one needed to protect oneself with ironic gestures 
when publishing the works of Max Müller.  
 By this time Müller’s essentially Kantian-cum-religious theories on the origin of 
language had been thoroughly eclipsed by Darwinian linguistics, and Müller began to 
be seen as a kind of quaint nineteenth-century sage. To cut a long and well-known 
story short: Müller held that language is always conceptual and that language roots 
emerge from a priori concepts similar to Kant’s categories. By making this claim, he 
argued that only human beings have the capacity for conceptual thought and language, 
which was in turn held to constitute a decisive point of demarcation between human 
beings and the animal kingdom. The most primordial act of conceptual thinking was, 
according to Müller, to be found in ancient human attempts to conceptualize the rising 
sun as a symbol of the infinite (hence the ‘Solar Myth’ with which Müller’s name 
became associated). During the early 1870s, these arguments were deployed as part of 
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a highly public campaign waged by Müller against Darwin’s Descent of Man, a 
debate which has attracted a high degree of scholarly attention that will not be added 
to here.4 Müller’s arguments of the 1870s were an elaboration upon his earlier 
opposition, already announced in the first volume of his Lectures on the Science of 
Language in 1861, to the implications of natural selection for questions of human 
descent. As Müller declared in 1861: 
 
The one great barrier between the brute and man is Language […] Language 
is something more than a fold of the brain, or an angle of the skull. It admits 
of no cavilling, and no process of natural selection will ever distil significant 
words out of the notes of birds or the cries of beasts […] language is our 
Rubicon and no brute will dare to pass it.5 
 
Despite its inherent pathos for religiously inclined audiences, this argument could not 
withstand the barrage of data assembled by Darwinian linguists during the 1870s and 
1880s, who argued that the mental capacity for language is already present in higher 
animals, and must, therefore, have evolved by natural selection.6 For this reason, 
Müller’s period of ascendancy in Britain was a relatively brief one, lasting from the 
mid-1850s until the gradual acceptance of Darwinism within diachronic linguistics, a 
process which had already begun by the time that the Descent of Man appeared in 
1871.  
 The focus of this paper will not be this phase of decline in Müller’s academic 
standing, but rather that of his ascendancy between roughly 1856 (the year in which 
Comparative Mythology was published) and 1871, the year in which two publications 
that were important for Müller appeared: Darwin’s Descent of Man and Edward 
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Burnett Tylor’s Primitive Culture.  The claim to be made here is that Müller’s use of 
the term ‘comparative’ in the title of his treatise on Comparative Mythology held a 
decisive importance within British intellectual history in the second half of the 
nineteenth century – an importance which, moreover, still has resonances within 
Anglophone comparative literature today. As George Stocking has shown in Victorian 
Anthropology, Müller’s essay on Comparative Mythology was an influential and 
controversial contribution to what was known as the ‘comparative method’ in 
evolutionist anthropology (with ‘evolutionism’ denoting broadly pre-Darwinian 
notions about cultural progress rather than evolution by natural selection). This is 
because Müller’s discipline of comparative philology was seen to have implications 
for debates concerning human monogenesis and polygenesis, and also those relating 
to cultural difference in the context of European colonial encounters with non-
European cultures. ‘In the 1850s’, writes Stocking in his authoritative study, ‘Müller’s 
inquiry had a reconstructive as well as genealogical interest’, and comparative 
philology was seen as ‘a form of prehistoric archaeology’. It was for this reason that 
Müller’s essay on comparative mythology is said to have ‘swept all of the materials of 
British folklore “into its orbit” for almost two decades’.7 
 Any discussion of Müller within the context of contemporary comparative literature 
must be accompanied by some disclaimers. In 1850s Britain, literary studies as it is 
currently taught in British universities did not yet exist, with the first degree devoted 
to English literature – as opposed to philology – being introduced at Oxford in 1894.8  
It was philology or more specifically diachronic linguistics, and not literary studies as 
currently understood, that was Müller’s primary research discipline, as well as being 
the forum for his version of the comparative method.9 Having studied under the 
Sanskritist Hermann Brockhaus in Leipzig, and later (between 1844 and 1846) under 
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Franz Bopp in Berlin, Müller belonged to the line of comparative philologists that 
emerged from the initial discoveries of William Jones in his ‘Third Anniversary 
Discourse’ of 1786.10 But such linguistic study was not clearly separated from literary 
culture and the broader context of Romanticism – especially the German Romantic 
interest in India.11 As the son of the minor philhellenic poet Wilhelm Müller (1794-
1827, otherwise known as ‘Griechen-Müller’), Max Müller was literally born into this 
Romantic tradition, and his interest in Asian cultures may well have been aroused by 
his exposure to Friedrich Schlegel’s Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier (On 
the Language and Wisdom of the Indians, 1808) and to Goethe’s West-östlicher Divan 
(West-Eastern Divan, 1819). In Berlin, Müller also encountered lectures by Schelling 
that would later appear in Schelling’s Philosophie der Mythologie (Philosophy of 
Mythology, 1856), and he also met with Schopenhauer in 1845.12 Like all of these 
authors, Müller’s image of ‘the East’, and more specifically of India, was heavily 
romanticized and bore little relation to contemporary realities; and although he was 
regarded as an expert on India in Victorian Britain, he never actually travelled there.  
 In 1846, Müller arrived in Britain in order to gain access to manuscripts of the 
Rigveda that were held by the East India Company in London. Müller’s six-volume 
edition of the Vedas was only completed in 1874, by which time he had already been 
established in Oxford for over twenty years, having been elected as Professor in the 
Taylorian Institute for Modern European Languages in 1854.13 Müller lost in the 
election for the prestigious Boden Chair of Sankrit in 1860, ostensibly on the grounds 
that he was associated with the Higher Bible Criticism of David Friedrich Strauss. 
The candidate who was eventually awarded this Chair – M. Monier-Williams – was 
apparently more inclined than Müller to see the study of Sanskrit and Indian 
languages along the lines of the Chair’s original founder, Colonel J. Boden, who had 
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opined that ‘a more general and critical knowledge of the Sanskrit language’ would 
better enable mass conversions to Christianity in British India.14  
 Although a specialist in Sanskrit, Müller’s career at Oxford developed in the context 
of the Taylorian Institute. In this capacity he gave lectures on ‘The Origin of the 
Romance Languages’, on ‘The History of German Civilisation and Literature, from 
the Earliest Times to the Reign of Charlemagne’, and on ‘German Literature of the 
Sixteenth Century’, among other subjects. On this basis, according to Müller’s most 
recent biographer, he ‘established a reputation as a specialist in German literature in 
England’.15 This reputation was reinforced when Müller published an influential 
edition of German Classics in 1858,16 and when he was appointed as the inaugural 
President of the English Goethe Society in 1886.17  
 From the perspective of present-day comparative literature, Müller can be seen as a 
rather curious research object. The comparative method to which he contributed was 
one that he deployed primarily in relation to ancient languages and myths, not in 
connection with modern literary texts. And as a more recent author on the 
comparative method in the history of anthropology has argued, the results achieved by 
this method often depended upon what one took to be its aims. Should comparisons be 
made in order to uncover similarities or differences between the things under 
investigation?18 Any answer to this question must itself compare Müller’s approach 
with that of other important thinkers in the history of comparative studies and 
intercultural relations. As we shall see in the following survey, in the case of the 
comparative method as deployed by Johann Wolfgang Goethe in relation to biological 
objects and later to national literatures, by Müller in relation to languages and myths, 
and by Müller’s important evolutionist contemporaries in British intellectual history – 
Herbert Spencer and Edward Burnett Tylor – in relation to European and non-
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European cultures, the answers to this question differed. Whereas Goethe tended to 
valorize difference and particularity over similarity, Müller undertook comparison in 
order to argue for a primordial unity between all peoples, languages and religions in 
the spirit of what might be called a universalist humanism and a primordial 
monotheism. Finally, Spencer and especially Tylor saw comparison as a method of 
explaining the differences between ‘civilized’ and ‘primitive’ societies in essentially 
pre-Darwinian evolutionist terms.  
 These debates were not devoid of later consequences for Anglophone literary studies 
and comparative literature. Goethe has rightly been seen as seminal to debates about 
the history of both comparative literature and so-called ‘world literature’.19 Moreover, 
the social evolutionist conception of the comparative method as it had been 
understood by both Spencer and Tylor found its way into an important study on 
Comparative Literature (1886), written by Hutcheson Macaulay Posnett,20 and as late 
as 1948, T. S. Eliot was still citing Tylor as the main authority on the concept of 
culture in English.21 Insofar as these debates are marked by issues relating to 
colonialism and cultural difference that are still alive in post-colonial and multi-ethnic 
societies like contemporary Britain, they are not merely of historical interest. Indeed, 
debates similar to those that took place at the origins of Anglophone comparative 
philology and comparative literature are still at least latently part of its contemporary 
existence. But in order to understand the nature of these debates in their original 
historical context, a brief reconstructive account of the comparative method, and of 
Müller’s essay on Comparative Mythology, will be necessary.  
 
THE BRITISH ‘COMPARATIVE METHOD’ AND ITS GERMANIC ROOTS  
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In Victorian Anthropology, George Stocking offers a useful summary of the general 
propositions elaborated by a number of nineteenth-century British thinkers under the 
moniker of the ‘comparative method’. According to Stocking, these thinkers held that 
‘sociocultural phenomena’ develop according to laws similar to those found in the 
natural world, with the basic developmental tendency being one of progress from 
simplicity to complexity. Since these thinkers assumed that all humans ‘share a single 
psychic nature’, it should be possible, they thought, to make cogent comparisons 
between different cultures according to their positions along a universally valid scale 
of human development. Differences in technology among various cultures would in 
these terms be explained by different rates of development, with European cultures 
having developed at the highest speed. According to this logic, earlier stages in 
European civilization would be roughly equivalent to the contemporary levels of 
cultural development found in some so-called ‘primitive’ societies. The ‘comparative 
method’ would be used in order to assess these similarities and differences.22 
 Stocking associates this collection of propositions with the general idea of ‘social’ or 
even ‘classical’ evolutionism. These evolutionist theories were conceived either prior 
to or concurrently with Darwin’s theory of natural selection and its eventual 
application to humankind in the Descent of Man. Some of the key texts in this 
tradition included Herbert Spencer’s long essay ‘Progress: Its Law and Cause’ (1857), 
Henry Maine’s The Ancient Law, Its Connection with the Early History of Society, 
and Its Relation to Modern Ideas (1861), John Lubbock’s Pre-Historic Times, As 
Illustrated by Ancient Remains, and the Manners and Customs of Modern Savages 
(1865), and two works by Tylor: Researches into the Early History of Mankind and 
the Development of Civilization (1865) and Primitive Culture (1871). In order to 
demonstrate the Germanic roots of this tradition, it is instructive to focus here upon 
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the earliest and arguably the most influential of these works: Spencer’s ‘Progress: Its 
Law and Cause’.  
 Spencer begins his essay by arguing that existing theories of progress are 
erroneously teleological in that they tend to define progress only in terms of increases 
in human happiness. By contrast, a more rigorous scientific approach would involve 
isolating laws of progress within the organic realm and seeing whether they can be 
applied to human societies. ‘In respect to that progress which individual organisms 
display in the course of their evolution’, writes Spencer, 
 
this question has been answered by the Germans. The investigations of 
Wolff, Goethe, and Von Baer, have established the truth that the series of 
changes gone through during the development of a seed into a tree, or an 
ovum into an animal, constitute an advance from homogeneity of structure 
to heterogeneity of structure […] Now, we propose in the first place to 
show, that this law of organic process is the law of all progress. Whether it 
be in the development of the Earth, in the development of Life upon its 
surface, in the development of Society, of Government, of Manufactures, of 
Commerce, of Language, of Literature, Science, Art, this same evolution of 
the simple into the complex, through a process of continuous differentiation, 
holds throughout. 23  
 
The application of biological models of development to human cultural forms, clearly 
on display in this passage, was part of the German tradition of philology that predates 
Spencer’s speculations by decades. Botanical metaphors such as Stamm (stem) and 
Wurzel (root) can, for example, be found in the philological writings of Friedrich 
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Schlegel and Franz Bopp. In 1808, Schlegel was already claiming that just as 
comparative anatomy had led to progress in biology, so too would comparative 
linguistics shed light on the phenomenon of language.24 Similarly, Bopp begins the 
first volume of his Vergleichende Grammatik (Comparative Grammar, 1833) by 
stating that languages are organisms characterized by physical and mechanical laws.25  
 That this tradition of German philology or Sprachwissenschaft argued that language 
development involves a form of progress from simplicity to complexity is 
demonstrated by perhaps the most prominent proponent of the biological or botanical 
analogy: August Schleicher, father of the Stammbaumtheorie (family tree theory) of 
language genealogy, who proposed that even the most highly organized of languages 
may originally have consisted of ‘basic roots’ which then coalesced to form 
‘composite’ constructions.26 Spencer recognizes an earlier contribution to this German 
tradition when he argues that ‘language in general exhibits advance from the 
homogeneous to the heterogeneous’, invoking the name of Max Müller in relation to 
this theory of language development.27 For Spencer, the terms ‘homogeneous’ and 
‘heterogeneous’ effectively came to mean ‘primitive’ and ‘advanced’ or ‘civilized’ 
when applied to human societies.   
 Like Spencer, Müller would also come to describe Goethe as a champion of the 
comparative method, citing his famous maxim ‘He who knows no foreign languages 
does not know anything about his own’ as the catchphrase of comparative philology.28 
In his course of lectures on comparative philology delivered at Oxford in 1851, 
Müller made an explicit claim for the scientific status of philology when he stated that 
‘the name “Comparative Philology” shows at once the comprehensive character  of 
the new science. In the same way as Comparative Anatomy comprises […] the 
anatomy of all organic beings, Comparative Philology comprises the study […] of all 
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languages spoken by man’.29 In this Müller was hardly an innovator. Müller’s novelty 
within the British context was to make these theories accessible to a learned British 
public by writing about them in English and by presenting public lectures that argued 
for the importance of philology in being able to answer key questions about human 
history. It was in this context that Müller also made his speculative claim for an 
underlying similarity between all human cultures, a claim that purportedly related to 
the human ability to conceptualize the infinite in language. For Müller, then, the main 
goal of comparison was to unveil a primordial unity that lay beneath all apparent 
diversity. In this he actually stood in opposition to another post-Kantian German 
theorist of comparison: Johann Wolfgang Goethe.  
 
GOETHE AND MÜLLER ON COMPARISON  
 
It may be possible to claim that processes of comparison can themselves be compared 
according to two essential methodological categories: the first being a method which, 
beginning with empirical observations, goes on to construct heuristic ideal types 
which may later be revised or adjusted depending on subsequent experience; the 
second assuming a priori an ideal commonality that is later seen to be confirmed 
through empirical observations. The first method is generally inductive; the second is 
deductive. In practice, most processes of comparison will use a combination of these 
methods, both of which would be subject to particular shortcomings when left in 
isolation: the weakness of the first method may be a lack of any consistent guiding 
model or hypothesis through which empirical observations could be ordered; while 
the weakness of the second method may be that the assumed commonality or identity 
will tend to influence, in advance, the selection of materials and the observations 
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made. The first model would tend to emphasize difference and particularity, whereas 
the second would stress similarity or even universality. In the following analysis it 
will be shown that Goethe’s approach can be situated more within the first category 
and Müller’s within the second.  
 During the 1790s, Goethe attempted to develop theoretical models that would help 
him to compare different botanical and zoological species with one another. These 
attempts were made under the influence of Kant’s third Critique, the Kritik der 
Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgement), which Goethe read more or less immediately 
upon its publication in 1790.30 The problem of comparison was for Goethe a Kantian 
problem, in that he felt that any process of anatomical comparison would need, at the 
outset, to develop a heuristic model or archetype against which individual organisms 
could be compared. We already see a naive version of this purely theoretical or formal 
notion of type in Goethe’s notion of the primal plant or Urpflanze, developed in the 
late 1780s,31 which Schiller would later (in 1794) famously declare to be not an object 
of experience but something more akin to Kant’s notion of an idea of pure reason.32   
 This notion of an organizing archetype appears again in Goethe’s essays on 
comparative anatomy written in 1795-96. There we are told that comparative anatomy 
requires us to develop a universal archetype of animal development that will be 
abstracted from empirical observations of different organisms: ‘Empirical observation 
must first teach us what parts are common to all animals, and how these parts differ. 
The idea must govern the whole, it must abstract the general picture in a genetic way. 
Once such an archetype is established, even if only provisionally, we may test it quite 
adequately by applying the customary methods of comparison.’33  Here Goethe insists 
that the archetype is nothing more than a provisional synthesis of separate empirical 
observations. It cannot be established purely a priori, but may be used heuristically, 
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roughly in the manner suggested by Kant in the third Critique, in order to guide 
further inquiries. In being nothing more than an abstraction derived from empirical 
observation, the archetype is open to testing and revision in light of further empirical 
experience. Individual species might then be ordered according to the extent to which 
they either conform to or depart from such an ideal type.  
 Goethe returns to these questions some two decades later, in a more explicitly 
literary context, in the introductory ‘Notes and Disquisitions’ to the West-Eastern 
Divan (Noten und Abhandlungen zum West-östlichen Divan).34 Drawing a specific 
analogy with biological comparison or Naturkunde, he discusses the possibility of 
identifying what he calls ‘natural forms of poetry’ (Naturformen der Poesie) which 
would have universal or transcultural validity. ‘Along this path’ according to Goethe, 
‘one can achieve a fine perspective upon the poetic varieties as well as on the 
characters of nations.’35 This discussion of natural poetic types occurs within the 
context of intercultural comparisons undertaken not only by Goethe in the Divan but 
also by William Jones in his ‘Essay on the Poetry of Eastern Nations’ of 1772.36  
 In his notes for the Divan, Goethe criticizes Jones for comparing the poetic 
productions of the Middle East too closely with European models, alleging that such 
comparisons may prevent the reader from seeing the Middle Eastern texts within their 
own cultural contexts. For Goethe, comparisons can only operate within certain limits 
that are revealed by the researcher’s level of reflexivity. In this connection he 
observes that ‘everyone makes judgement easier for himself through comparison, but 
one also makes it more difficult: because when an analogy, in being pushed too far, is 
halted, so too will a comparative judgment become always more unfitting, the more 
closely one observes it’.37 Of note here is the merely provisional status that Goethe 
affords to such comparative archetypes. As a keen reader of Kant, Goethe is aware 
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that such models are merely the constructions of our reason rather than models that 
are likely to coincide with empirical reality in itself. It is for precisely for this reason 
that they need to be tested against empirical reality.  
 It was this Kantian awareness that made Goethe into a thinker who emphasized 
particularity and difference over and above commonality and unity. Goethe 
recognizes that archetypes, theories and general models are indispensable for 
processes of comparison, but he also continually emphasizes the right of nature, or in 
this case of literary texts, to differ from these models. Nevertheless, this did not 
prevent Goethe from lapsing into a classical Eurocentrism when it came to proposing 
his purportedly universal categories of literary classification. ‘There are’, he writes, 
‘only three authentic natural forms of poetry: the clearly narrating, the enthusiastically 
inspired, and the personally plot-oriented: Epos, Lyric and Drama.’ 38 Peter Szondi 
has shown the extent to which these categories were inspired by Goethe’s reading of 
Aristotle’s Poetics,39 suggesting that any purportedly transcultural or universal 
categories of cultural analysis will always be conceived within a particular cultural 
context – in this case, Greek classicism – that would limit their objectivity. 
 How does this approach compare with that of Max Müller in the essay on 
Comparative Mythology? The answer to this question is a straightforward one: 
whereas Goethe, despite his eventual Eurocentrism, is interested in difference and 
particularity, Müller wishes to demonstrate an underlying commonality among myths 
that he sees as belonging to the so-called ‘Aryan’ or Indo-Germanic languages. This 
underlying unity is said by Müller to have existed in what he calls the ‘mythological 




 Comparative philology has since brought this whole period within the pale of 
documentary history. It has placed in our hands a telescope of such power that, 
where formerly we could see but nebulous clouds, we now discover distinct forms 
and outlines; nay, it has given us what we may call contemporary evidence, 
exhibiting to us the state of thought, language, religion and civilisation at a period 
when Sanskrit was not yet Sanskrit, Greek not yet Greek, but when both, together 
with Latin, German and other Aryan dialects, existed as yet as one undivided 
language.40  
 
At the level of rhetoric, this passage demonstrates the way in which Müller tended to 
use natural scientific metaphors in order to establish the prestige of comparative 
philology. This new discipline will, he argues, provide us with a telescope through 
which we can gaze into ancient history. It will also allow us to resolve, once and for 
all, a philosophical problem that had confronted Western philosophers at least since 
Socrates’s critiques of myth in Plato’s dialogues. Namely, what is the function of 
myths and why do myths appear to be so irrational? 
 Müller’s well-known answer is that myth is a ‘disease of language’.41 He speculates 
that early ‘Aryan’ dialects were characterized by a series of general and abstract 
substantives – such as ‘day’, ‘night’, ‘sky’, ‘earth’ or ‘thunder’ – that did not refer to 
particular objects but rather to general potentialities or forces which were seen to act 
upon the world, even if no definite subject could be identified as generating these 
forces. Since in ancient Greek and Sanskrit these general and abstract substantives 
were assigned genders, ‘it was simply impossible to speak of morning or evening, of 
spring and winter, without giving to these conceptions something of an individual, 
active, sexual and at last personal character’.42 Myth therefore emerges from ‘that 
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particular difficulty which the human mind experiences in speaking of collective or 
abstract ideas’.43 And once these natural forces had been assigned genders and 
personalities, it was inevitable, in Müller’s view, that this would lead to elaborate 
narratives involving male and female gods. The classical example used by Müller to 
make this argument is the Hindu god Dyaus, who is associated with the sky and sun, 
and is said to ‘light the sky’. Linguistically the term Dyaus is said by Müller to 
underlie the Indo-European derivations of deva, deus and deity.44 All three terms 
emerged, in Müller’s view, from the Sanskrit root div or dyu: to shine or brighten. In 
this way, Dyaus is said to be the Sanskrit version of the god that was known in Europe 
as Zeus and Jupiter.45 It is this web of speculative philological arguments – all of 
which are aimed at demonstrating an underlying similarity between the Sanskrit and 
ancient Greek cultures – that led to the ‘Solar Myth’ pilloried by Littledale in the 
quotation that begins this article.  
 For Müller, the evidence provided by ancient Greek and Sanskrit literature leads 
back to the primordial moment at which the ancient ‘Aryans’ first attempted to 
describe the dawn. What was initially a simple description of a natural phenomenon is 
said to have degenerated over time into a series of elaborate narratives involving gods 
and goddesses. In this way Müller is able to present himself as the scholar-detective: 
digging beneath the surface of these myths in order to find the ancient language roots 
that underlie them. Myths that seem, on the surface, to be different, are thereby said to 
have emerged from a single common source. But Müller’s common source is not 
merely a hypothetical model as in the case of Goethe. For Müller it is much more a 
buried historical fact that can purportedly be deduced from the grammatical 
similarities between Sanskrit and ancient Greek. In other words, Müller’s conception 
of comparative method seeks to find a primordial unity that underlies diversity. In this 
	 17	
he demonstrates both the pitfalls and the potential benefits of a comparative method 
that emphasizes similarity over difference.  
 
MÜLLER’S CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE, OR: A ‘NEGATIVE 
DIALECTICS’ OF COMPARISON  
  
The question as to whether Müller’s ideas on the comparative method are in any way 
relevant to the discipline of comparative literature today must be preceded by some 
observations on historical context. The first point to make is that Müller was a 
philologist and not a literary scholar in our modern sense of that term. His main task, 
within the context of the Taylorian Institution, was the teaching of diachronic 
linguistics and not the interpretation of literary texts. Second, Müller’s arguments 
concerning the underlying unity of a primordial ‘Aryan’ language were couched 
within the more speculative idea that all languages might have emerged from a single 
common source. Such arguments were in part made in order to oppose the theory of 
human polygenesis – the notion that there are different species of human beings with 
entirely separate biological origins. This idea was not entirely killed off until well 
after the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man had been published.46  
 Yet even when these contexts are taken into account, Müller’s desire to find an 
underlying unity beneath diversity would seem to be completely at odds with the 
contemporary concerns of comparative literature. Whereas contemporary comparative 
literature might tend to celebrate difference, particularity, cultural specificity and 
(most recently) untranslatability as a means of critiquing so called ‘world literature’,47 
Müller’s approach was characterized by a Christian humanism that had some at least 
questionable political consequences. Here Müller’s ideas about India are a case in 
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point. In many ways Müller was – at least within the context of his age – tolerant and 
progressive in relation to British policy in India. He advised missionaries to find 
points of commonality between the Hindu and Christian traditions, rather than urging 
complete conversion from the former to the latter. ‘By unduly depreciating all other 
religions’, he wrote in 1870, ‘we have placed our own in a position which its founder 
never intended for it; we have torn it away from the sacred context of the history of 
the world.’48 Expanding upon these ideas in a controversial lecture delivered at 
Westminster Abbey in 1873, Müller even speculated that a new religion might be 
created out of both traditions. ‘Whenever two religions’, he argued, 
 
are brought into contact, when members of each live together in peace, 
abstaining from all direct attempts at conversion […] it calls out the best 
elements in each, and at the same time keeps under all that is of doubtful 
value, of uncertain truth. Whenever this has happened in the history of the 
world, it has generally led to the reform of both systems, or to the 
foundation of a new religion.49  
 
Although progressive for their time, these ideas were framed by the notion that the 
ancient Vedas were in fact monotheistic in orientation, and that Hinduism and 
Christianity had emerged from a single and primordial religion based upon worship of 
the sun. Within this context, Hindu polytheism was seen as a degenerated form of a 
primordial and monotheistic Hinduism.50 Many in India perceived this to be a heavily 
biased Christian take on the Hindu tradition, and this is perhaps why one Indian 
biography of Max Müller carries a very polemical title indeed.51  
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 Müller’s desire, expressed through his use of the comparative method, to find 
similarity and unity between the East and the West led him to appropriate the 
otherness of India to his own Christian cultural context. This won him both friends 
and enemies in India, where his name still adorns all Goethe Institutes, known as Max 
Müller Bhavans. Further to this, and as Léon Poliakov has convincingly argued,52 
Müller’s speculations about an ancient ‘Aryan’ language that later branched off into 
Sanskrit and ancient Greek provided fuel for later attempts to draw links between 
language and race, even if Müller himself discouraged the making of such 
connections when he observed that ‘it is unscientific [...] to speak of an Aryan race, of 
Aryan blood or of Aryan skulls and then to attempt to make ethnological 
classifications upon linguistic foundations’.53  
 The potential value of Müller, and perhaps one of the reasons why he has come to be 
seen – at least in some quarters – as a beacon of intercultural understanding within the 
context of Western encounters with India, is the extent to which he offered an 
appealing counter-model to mainstream social evolutionism as found in thinkers such 
as Spencer and Tylor. In this context, a comparative method that emphasized 
universality and similarity over difference had the effect of implicitly opposing the 
dominant paradigm of social evolutionism and its notion that culture ‘progresses’ in 
stages from simplicity to complexity and from ‘primitive’ to ‘civilized’ – a paradigm 
that saw the cultures of northern Europe as representing the highest possible point 
along the scale of cultural development. George Stocking has underlined the political 
significance of Müller’s thesis concerning a commonality between the ancient Greek 
and Sanskrit traditions – a notion which, following the so-called ‘Indian Mutiny’ of 
1858, suggested that ‘one blood flowed’ in the veins of British soldiers and the Indian 
‘mutineers’ whom they sought to suppress.54 And despite the fact that Müller’s 
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version of the comparative method came to be associated with social evolutionism, 
Müller’s thesis that myth is a ‘disease of language’ also implied that human societies 
are subject not only to progress but also to degeneration, or a kind of falling off from 
a pure and primordial scene of revelation that is universal to all humanity. If the 
ability to conceive of the infinite in language can already be found in the ‘Solar 
Mythology’ belonging to Müller’s ‘mythological age’, then even the earliest human 
societies had the ability to form sophisticated and abstract concepts in language.  
 This deeply religious idea, which also fed into Müller’s critique of Darwin, placed 
Müller on a direct collision course with the social evolutionist mainstream of 
Victorian thought, represented by Spencer and especially by Tylor. While Müller 
found in the Vedas evidence of a primal monotheism which had allegedly 
‘degenerated’ into polytheistic mythology through the ‘disease of language’, Tylor 
held the opposite view: namely, that monotheism is an evolved form of the animistic 
polytheism that colonial ethnographers had found in the myths of various ‘primitive’ 
cultures. These two schools of thought – the first often called the ‘etymological 
school’ and associated with Müller and later with the German theologian Wilhelm 
Schmidt;55 the second the anthropological school, linked with Spencer and Tylor, with 
the anthropologist and historian Andrew Lang, and later with James George Frazer, 
author of the Golden Bough – were engaged in public debate during the closing stages 
of the nineteenth century.56 The main issue at stake in this debate was the nature of 
human progress.  
 As we have seen, Spencer maintains that human progress, like all forms of progress 
in his view, moves from a state of homogeneity and simplicity to one of heterogeneity 
and complexity. According to this model, ‘primitive’ or homogeneous levels of 
development can still be observed among ‘existing barbarous tribes’, while 
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heterogeneity or civilization can be seen in its most advanced state in European 
culture.57 A similar view is taken by Tylor in Primitive Culture, where we are 
informed that ‘the educated world of Europe and America practically settles a 
standard by simply placing its nations at one end of the social series and savage tribes 
at the other, arranging the rest of mankind between these limits [...] as they 
correspond more closely to savage or to cultured life’.58 These essentially colonialist 
and racist ideas – often informed by the ‘fieldwork’ of amateur ethnographers in 
colonial outposts who had been primed in advance by evolutionist theory59 – directly 
influenced Anglophone literary studies, most obviously in Frazer’s Golden Bough and 
its subsequent reception by T. S. Eliot,60 but also in Hutcheson Macaulay Posnett’s 
important monograph on Comparative Literature (1886).61  
 For Posnett, various forms of literature emerge from ‘social and mental evolution’, 
which belongs to the general ‘movement of civilization’.62 Comparison, which is the 
‘primary scaffolding’ of human thought, allows us to see the emergence of these 
literary forms, and it was the ‘discovery of the New World’ which ‘awakened men’ to 
contrasts in the different stages of civilization.63 Posnett’s approach to comparative 
literature was a polemical response to Arnoldian notions about literary value, which 
he saw as inherently speculative and unscientific. Publishing his study on 
Comparative Literature within Kegan Paul’s International Scientific Series – which 
also included works by Spencer, by the Darwinian linguist William Dwight Whitney, 
and by perhaps Darwin’s staunchest champion in Britain, Thomas Henry Huxley – 
Posnett was aiming to establish comparative literature as a discipline within the social 
sciences.    
 ‘Literature’, according to Posnett, ‘far from enshrining universal forms and ideas of 
beauty, owes both its creative and critical works to the development of social life.’64 
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Drawing upon the social evolutionism of Henry Maine, Posnett sees literary 
development as mirroring the progression from clan societies to modern nation states, 
in which the life of the individual comes to be seen as more important than that of the 
group. It is such conditions that enable what Posnett calls the ‘principle of literary 
growth’; namely: ‘the progressive deepening and widening of personality’.65  
  Such a view of comparative literature was of course inclined to see European letters 
as existing at the advanced end upon the scale of literary evolution. This is why, to 
cite just one example, Posnett sees ‘the castes and village communities of India’ and 
the ‘family system and sentiments of China’ as having ‘prevented the growth of that 
individualised life which has become in Europe the main source of literary as well as 
of scientific ideas’.66 Such claims were made without any reading knowledge of the 
languages in question – Posnett in fact admits to having used Müller’s translation of 
the Vedas67 – and on the basis that literary texts can be reduced to the sociological 
conditions that purportedly underlie them.  
 Against this backdrop, the humanist and philological character of Müller’s emphasis 
upon similarity and underlying unity is revealed. Whereas Spencer, Tylor and Posnett 
deploy the comparative method in order to reveal differences marked out upon an 
evolutionary continuum that leads onwards and upwards into the purportedly 
liberating light of European civilization, Müller carries out linguistic comparisons in 
order to reconstruct an (admittedly speculative) primordial unity at the very origins of 
humankind, origins that are located at the intersection between West and East, 
between ancient Greek and Sanskrit. And whereas the British thinkers took from 
Goethe the idea that comparison enables one to see progressive development along an 
evolutionary scale, Müller emphasizes Goethe’s genuine interest in non-European 
cultures and languages, even if – particularly in Müller’s case – such an interest 
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tended to see these cultures (especially Hinduism) is specious monotheistic and 
Christian terms. In the Preface to the 2003 edition of Orientalism, Edward Said 
invokes precisely this ‘humanist’ tradition of German philology as the main line of 
inheritance to which he sees himself as belonging as a comparatist.68  And if, as one 
of the recent American Comparative Literature Association ‘State of the Discipline’ 
reports has suggested, contemporary comparative literature in the West has been 
shaped not only by the legacies of European colonialism, but also by the co-existence 
of Western and non-Western cultures within modern societies,69 then the two 
competing historical versions of the comparative method discussed in this paper – 
comparison in order to identify difference and comparison in search of similarity – are 
not of mere antiquarian interest. Indeed, the questions that they raise concerning 
civilization, progress and the relations between the religions and cultures of the West 
and the East continue to stand at the very centre of our discipline today. 
 The opposition between inductive (empirical) and deductive (a priori) modes of 
comparison is one so basic to thought that it cannot be overcome or ‘sublated’. In 
contemporary debates about culture within multicultural Western societies, it seems 
that both must be held in tension with one another. This would amount to a ‘negative 
dialectics’ of cultural comparison in which neither of the two positions can be 
regarded as foundational.70 One the one hand, cultural specificity and particularly the 
value attached to individual languages and traditions, along with the need to grant 
special rights in order to accommodate some cultural groups, should not be 
relinquished in the name of a Eurocentric conception of enlightenment humanism.71 
Yet on the other hand, some conception of universal human rights, and some at least 
implicit notion of an overall human project that involves progress, are seemingly 
essential to any society, and in the West, such conceptions usually emerge from 
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European sources. This tension is most obviously apparent in Western debates 
concerning the extent to which the religious practices of some non-European 
immigrants may infringe upon individual human rights, especially those of women.72  
  It is clear that Müller – in arguing for a primordial unity at the ‘dawn’ of culture – 
situated himself on the universalist and a priori end of this spectrum, and in this he 
demonstrates both the advantages and the pitfalls of universalism. The assertion of a 
primordial unity at the origins of humanity brings with it an essential humanism 
according to which all traditions are afforded a basic measure of respect. But it also 
carries the risk of projecting one’s own cultural prejudices and preoccupations onto 
the purported origin. In Müller’s case, this involved positing a primordial monotheism 
at the beginnings of Hinduism, a claim which led him to misread the Hindu tradition 
and which garnered him enemies in the Indian subcontinent. For our discipline, 
Müller is instructive in the following sense: the urge to translate, to understand, to 
decode, and to find similarity is indispensable to cultural comparison. But this urge 
must be tempered by high levels of reflexivity of the kind that Goethe recommended 
if it is not to collapse into Eurocentric projection and cultural hegemony. The ‘world’ 
is always seen from one’s own perspective, and so any conception of a universal 
‘human’ culture, or for that matter of ‘world’ literature,73 must be accompanied by an 
awareness of the inherent risks of universalism. 
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